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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Appellant challenges an "Order And Judgment" filed 
October 15, 1982 that was a final order on the alter ego issue. 
May an appellant seeks review of that final order or judgment 
more than two years after it was made? Or should the appellant 
have filed a notice of his intention to appeal as provided by 
Rule 72(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that were then in 
effect? 
2. If the appeal on the alter ego issue is considered on 
its merits, was the ruling of the lower court correct when it 
found that Dixie Power And Water, Inc. was the alter ego of 
Darrell G. Hafen? In the usual case, the alter ego doctrine, or 
piercing the corporate veil, is applied to reach the personal 
assets of the person using the corporation improperly. But may 
piercing the corporate veil be applied "backwards", that is, to 
reach assets placed in a corporation to collect a personal debt, 
if the corporation is one where practically none of the corporate 
formalities have been observed and the corporation is dominated 
and controlled by one individual who incurred the debt in his 
individual capacity? 
3. Did all the defendants make a general appearance in 
court on the first writ of attachment? Did such general 
appearance make actual personal service of process or notice of 
hearing on the writ unnecessary? Did the court therefore err in 
dissolving the first writ of attachment? Even if the first writ 
was properly dissolved, wasnft there a second writ properly 
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issued, served, and hearing had thereon? Or did the court err in 
granting the writ of attachment? 
4. May an attorney's lien be impressed on property that 
does not belong to the attorney's client? Was the attorney's 
lien filed before the court had ruled that the attached funds 
were not the client's assets, but the assets of Darrell G. Hafen? 
If so, and even if the attorney's lien is valid, were there any 
funds to attach? Had Dixie's attorney filed an answer containing 
a counterclaim at any time prior to filing his alleged lien? Was 
there a verdict, report, decision, or judgment in his client's 
favor? Transamerica contends all these questions must be 
answered in the affirmative before a valid attorney's lien is 
created. The proper answer to these questions is "no", and 
therefore, no valid attorney's lien ever arose. 
5. Was summary judgment proper? Has appellant presented on 
appeal any genuine issue on any material fact? Does Section 
76-3-201.2(2) of the Utah Code apply? If so, isn't it conclusive 
on the issues of liability and amount of damages? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Dixie Power And Water, Inc. appeals from an 
"Order Granting Summary Judgment" to the plaintiffs following a 
hearing on November 21, 1984. Appellant also seeks review of an 
"Order And Judgment" filed October 15, 1982 which held that 
appellant was the alter ego of the individual defendant Darrell 
G. Hafen and that appellant's assets were in fact the assets of 
Hafen. Appellant also challenges the issuance of a writ of 
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attachment and asserts that his attorney has a valid attorney's 
lien on the attached funds. Respondent seeks to uphold the 
rulings of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Transamerica Cash Reserve (Transamerica) is a money 
market mutual fund that sells shares to the public, invests those 
proceeds in short-term investments, and passes the income on to 
its investors or shareholders (T 18). First National Bank of 
Boston is the transfer agent for Transamerica (T 20). 
On September 21, 1981, defendant Darrell G. Hafen 
(Hafen) opened an account with Transamerica (T 22), and between 
that date and December 31, 1981, Hafen made 22 deposits (share 
purchases) totaling $1,465,000.00. Of these deposits, only 
$12,000.00 were good. Meanwhile, Hafen made 20 redemptions, or 
checks, and obtained $406,380.75 in cash, leaving Transamerica 
with a net loss of $394,380.75. Transamerica was able to recover 
all but $93,426.59 of this loss through banking channels. (T 
39-41, 47; Exhibit P-l). All of the deposits were admitted into 
evidence (Exhibit P-3), as were all of the check redemptions 
(Exhibit P-4). Summary judgment for $93,426.59 was granted at a 
hearing on November 21, 1984 (R 506) and the judgment was filed 
December 3, 1984 (R 507-509). 
Hafen was prosecuted and convicted of mail fraud in the 
United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, in 
Criminal No. 82 00053, on the same deposits that pertain to this 
action (R 476-503) . 
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Transamerica commenced this civil action on February 5, 
1982, filing a verified complaint (R 1-27), a motion for a 
prejudgment writ of attachment (R 30), the required undertaking 
(R 28-29) , and obtained a writ of attachment that was served on 
First Security Bank (R 32-35) where funds were on deposit under 
the name of Dixie Power And Water, Inc. (Dixie), a corporation 
alleged in the complaint to be the alter ego of Hafen. The funds 
were placed in an interest bearing account (R 39) by the clerk of 
the court. 
The hearing on the prejudgment writ of attachment came 
on for hearing February 11, 1982, but was continued at Hafenfs 
request until March 9, 1982 (R 37-38). On March 9, 1982, 
Defendants appeared by counsel, Fay E. Reber, and moved for a 
continuance to April 13, 1982. Transamerica stipulated to said 
continuance, and the court entered its "Order Continuing Hearing" 
on March 11, 1982, and continued the writ (R 50-51). On April 
13, 1982, the day set for hearing, attorney Scott A. Gubler 
appeared for Dixie and filed documents objecting to the writ. 
The hearing was again continued to May 10th by agreement (R 64, 
84-85). On May 10, 1982, the court heard the testimony of John 
Hafen, the son of Darrell G. Hafen (D 3:16-20), who had given his 
deposition in this matter on May 7, 1982. At the May 10th 
hearing, the court found that Darrell G. Hafen, the President of 
Dixie (D. 4:12), failed to appear for his deposition scheduled 
for May 7, 1982, and ordered him to appear for the taking of his 
deposition on May 21, 1982, and continued the writ (R 69-71). 
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On May 20, 1982, Attorney Scott A. Gubler filed his 
affidavit in which he states that Hafen had resigned as President 
of Dixie on or about May 14, 1982 because Hafen thought his 
refusal to attend the deposition could bring sanctions against 
Dixie (R 81-82). On May 18, 1982, Transamerica requested the 
court to rule, based upon the testimony of John Hafen at the May 
10, 1982 hearing, that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen (R 
73-74) . Appellant has not obtained a transcript of this 
testimony as part of the record on appeal. Transamerica also 
moved for default judgment on the grounds that all Defendants had 
made general appearances by counsel but had not filed an answer 
to the complaint (R 75-76) . 
The matter came on for hearing on June 8, 1982, and the 
parties presented their arguments. The court ruled, based on the 
file and the testimony of John Hafen, that Dixie was the alter 
ego of Hafen and that the assets of Dixie were the assets of 
Hafen. John Hafen1s testimony of May 10, 1982 has not been made 
part of the record on appeal. Without that record to review on 
appeal, this court cannot second guess or question the lower 
court's finding that Dixie was, in fact, the alter ego of Hafen 
and that the purported assets of Dixie were, in fact, the assets 
of Hafen. The court requested Transamerica's attorneys to 
prepare the findings and judgment on the alter ego issue. 
At the same June 8, 1982 hearing, the court also ruled 
that the writ should be dissolved because notice was not properly 
served on Dixie as required by Rule 64A(7) U.R.C.P. (R 167-168) , 
even though Dixie had actual notice and its counsel had made 
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several appearances in the matter. The court requested Dixie's 
attorney to prepare this order. Proposed findings and judgments 
were prepared by Dixie (R 155-156, 169-170), and by Transamerica 
(R 157, 160-164). Dixie filed objections to Transamerica1s 
documents (R 165-166) , and Transamerica filed objections to 
Dixie's documents (R 158-159). 
Because of the June 8, 1982 ruling dissolving this 
first writ of attachment, Transamerica immediately sought, on 
June 9, 1982, a second writ of attachment (R 152-154). The judge 
held these documents, along with many others, in the file in his 
chambers until October 15, 1982. This explains why the record 
shows all these documents being filed with the clerk on October 
15, 1982, which was when the court finally made some decisions in 
this matter. In the meantime, personal service of the summons 
and complaint on all Defendants was obtained on June 10, 1982 
when Darrell G. Hafen was served in custody at the Terminal 
Island Correction Facility (R 96-98). On July 2, 1982, Hafen 
filed an answer for all Defendants (R 99-103) , even though Mr. 
Gubler also claimed to be representing Dixie. In this answer, 
Hafen claimed he was President of both corporate Defendants, 
despite Mr. Gublerfs affidavit that Hafen had resigned (R 81-82) 
as President of Dixie on May 14, 1982. 
On July 14, 1982, the objections to the form of the 
findings and judgments or orders were considered, and the court 
signed in open court (Tl 4:11-18) the documents that reflected 
its rulings of June 8, 1982 on both the alter ego issue (R 
171-174) and the dissolution of the first writ of attachment (R 
10 
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under advisement and continued until an October 15, 1982 hearing, 
at which time the court ruled that the attorney's lien claimed by 
Scott A. Gubler should be impressed on the attached funds (R 
150-151; 177). 
The court also ruled that a new Writ Of Attachment 
should issue, and did issue such writ, which was served on the 
Clerk of the court October 19, 1982 as the present custodian of 
the funds. The hearing thereon was scheduled for October 25, 
1982 (R 190-191), but continued by the court to October 27, 1982 
(R 182-183). A new undertaking was secured and filed (R 181). 
Also on October 15, 1982, the same day as the Order was 
made, Transamerica moved to amend, pursuant to Rule 59(a) (7) 
U.R.C.P., the ruling impressing the attorney's lien on the 
grounds that such a ruling was an error in law and contrary to 
the court's prior ruling that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen 
and that Dixie's purported assets were in fact the assets of 
Hafen (R 178-179) . Transamerica argued that this prior ruling 
prevented the lien from attaching to funds not belonging to Mr. 
Gubler's client. The court issued its "Order For Stay" October 
15, 1982, preventing the Clerk from releasing the funds to 
satisfy the claimed attorney's lien until further order of the 
court (R 180). 
At the October 27, 1982 hearing on the Writ Of 
Attachment, the court heard the testimony of Transamerica's 
treasurer regarding Hafen's account and heard the testimony of 
John Hafen, son of Darrell G. Hafen, and took the matter under 
12 
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as Judge Burns seldom opens court prior to 10:00 a.m. As ordered 
by the court, counsel for both parties appeared at the time and 
place ordered, but Judge Burns failed to appear. Finally, at the 
risk of incurring the wrath of the court, Transamerica filed a 
"Demand For Ruling" on July 3, 1985. The matter came on for 
hearing Monday, July 8, 1985. As shown by the minute entry for 
said date, the court wanted to see counsel in chambers Thursday 
or Friday, July 11 or 12, 1985. However, before that could be 
done, the court prepared and executed its "Order Striking 
Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law" the next day, 
July 9, 1985. This document was filed with the clerk the next 
day. Apparently, this is the court's ruling on Dixie's 
post-judgment motions. 
That appeal was eventually dismissed on this very 
basis, see Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Hafen 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 
33 (8/05/86) . The case was remanded to the trial court for 
proper disposition of Dixie's motion to amend the judgment. On 
September 9, 1986, upon motion and hearing, the trial court 
denied the post-judgment motions of the defendants, as reflected 
in an order signed September 17, 1986. Notice of the entry of 
that order was given to defendants by mail on September 18, 1986. 
Dixie then filed a timely "Notice of Appeal" on October 1, 1986, 
but all other defendants, including Hafen, have failed to appeal. 
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the secretary of Dixie, yet he knew almost nothing about its 
corporate affairs. His lack of knowledge, manifested in his 
deposition, is typical of instances where the corporate shell has 
been pierced as a facade or "pocketbook" of a dominant 
stockholder. The corporate veil is properly pierced "backwards" 
when an individual incurs substantial personal liability and 
keeps himself insolvent by holding his major assets in 
corporations that he treats as his own pocketbook. In such 
cases, it is proper to pierce the corporate veil and hold that 
the corporate assets are really the assets of the individual, 
which was exactly what the lower court held (R 171-174) . 
The trial court issued a writ of attachment that was 
later dissolved because it was not served as required by Rule 
64A(7) U.R.C.P., but that rule only requires that the notice 
gives "the adverse party actual notice of the proceeding. . .". 
In this case, all defendants had actual notice of the hearing to 
be held on the writ of attachment. This is evident from the fact 
that all defendants appeared by counsel in the matter prior to 
the hearings held May 10, 1982 and June 8, 1982. Thus, the 
original writ should not have been dissolved. Further, as soon 
as it was dissolved, Transamerica filed a written motion for a 
new writ and then moved in open court (on July 14, 1982) for a 
new writ of attachment. Thus, the second writ was secured with 
notice to Dixie. This motion was taken under advisement by the 
court until it was granted on October 15, 1982. Notice was 
properly given and hearing thereon held. There were no defects 
in the second writ of attachment. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. RULE 73(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(NOW RULES 3 AND 4 U.R.A.P.) PRECLUDE THE APPEAL 
ON THE ALTER EGO ISSUE SINCE THAT "ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT" WAS FILED OCTOBER 15, 1982 AND NO 
APPEAL WAS TAKEN WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWED. 
The key issue on Dixie's appeal is the ruling that 
Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen. Unless Dixie can upset this 
ruling, Dixie's argument and claim for an attorney's lien must 
also fail because an attorney's lien is good only against 
property of the attorney's client (see Point IV, infra), and if 
the alter ego ruling stands, the rest of Dixie's arguments 
likewise fail because it is Hafen, and not Dixie, that has 
standing to appeal any other issues. However, Hafen has not 
filed any appeal in this case. 
Transamerica contends that the appeal is not timely on 
the alter ego issue, and that the appeal must therefore be 
dismissed. The "Order And Judgment" on the alter ego issue was 
made June 8, 1982, signed July 14, 1982 and filed October 15, 
1982 (R 171-172). The wording of the judgment stated: 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, That the 
purported corporate entity, Dixie Power and Water, 
Inc. is the alter ego of Darrell Hafen and the assets 
purportedly owned by said Dixie Power and Water, Inc. 
are the assets of Defendant Darrell Hafen." 
This was clearly a final judgment on the alter ego issue. From 
and after this ruling, Dixie had no further interest or stake in 
the lawsuit. The" assets Dixie claimed had been adjudged to 
belong to Hafen. No other issues in the lawsuit involved Dixie, 
only Hafen and the remaining defendants. Dixie's remedy was 
either an immediate appeal on that issue or the filing of a 
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heading or frank of these documents, and the amendment was 
allowed (R 237), as reported in T2 3:7-14, as follows: 
"THE COURT: Now, next, you have a "Motion to Amend the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," that is 
strictly to strike your frank from the pleading? 
MR. GUBLER: That is correct. 
THE COURT: You can either retype it without your name 
on them or you can take a pencil and scratch it out. 
MR. GUBLER: Thank you, your Honor." 
Dixie's attorney apparently did not care to pursue it further, as 
the documents were never retyped nor was his frank scratched out 
on the documents. No other objection was ever filed to amend or 
change the "Order And Judgment" that Dixie was the alter ego of 
Hafen. Therefore, objections going to that ruling, or which 
collaterally attack that ruling, especially on appeal where no 
notice of appeal of that issue was filed for more than two years 
after its entry, should be disregarded as untimely and final. 
II. THE COURT'S RULING ON THE ALTER EGO ISSUE WAS 
CORRECT. 
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity 
separate and apart from the individuals controlling it is a legal 
theory introduced for purposes of convenience and to subserve the 
ends of justice. If the concept is extended beyond its reason 
and policy, or when invoked in support of an end subversive of 
this policy, it will be disregarded by the courts and the 
corporation and the individuals controlling it will be treated as 
identical. See Stine v. Girola 9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959), 
46 ALR3d 428, and 18 Am.Jur.2d Corporations Section 14, page 559. 
Dixie contends on this appeal that the alter ego 
doctrine cannot be used to pierce the corporate veil unless the 
corporation has committed some kind of fraud, acting through an 
agent, such as a major shareholder, a director, or an officer. 
Dixie correctly states that disregard of the corporate entity is 
most commonly applied where an individual creates a corporation 
and then does acts (i.e., commits a fraud) within the corporation 
giving a third party a cause of action, and then unlawfully uses 
the corporation to shield him from personal liability. But Dixie 
is wrong when it argues that the alter ego doctrine cannot be 
used when an individual has incurred personal liability but seeks 
to avoid his creditor's claims by holding all his assets in a 
corporation, at least where the individual totally disregards 
corporate formalities and the corporation is nothing more than 
the individual's "incorporated pocketbook". 
Dixie asks this court to reconsider the lower court's 
ruling of June 8, 1982 that Dixie is the alter ego of Hafen and 
that its assets are really the assets of Darrell Hafen. They 
want to claim the assets were not subject to prejudgment 
attachment for Hafen's fraudulent and criminal liability to 
Transamerica. However, Dixie has not obtained a transcript of 
the May 10, 1982 hearing upon which the lower court's ruling was 
based. Without that transcript, this court cannot adequate 
review that decision, even though this court does have the 
"Deposition of John Hafen" (Exhibit P-20) , the alleged secretary 
of Dixie. 
But even if this court looks only to that transcript 
and the Court pleadings, there is ample reason to uphold the 
ruling. First, Darrell G. Hafen was the President of Dixie, but 
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refused to submit to a deposition (R 69-71). Upon being ordered 
to submit to a deposition, he resigned as President of Dixie by a 
telephone call to Dixie's attorney (R 81-82). Yet, a month 
later, without any further corporation action or meetings, he 
files an answer with the court (R 99-103) in which he states he 
is again the President of Dixie. Mr. Darrell G. Hafen is playing 
games with the court. He is President when he wants to be, but 
isn't when it is uncomfortable or inconvenient. 
With the deposition of John Hafen, the son of Darrell G. 
Hafen, and the alleged "secretary" of Dixie, we have more than 
ample reason to disregard the corporation. John Hafen stated in 
his deposition that he did not know if there was a vice president 
(D 4:13-14); that he was not aware that as secretary he was 
supposed to keep the corporate records (D 4:15-18); that he did 
not keep the records and did not know who did (D 4:19-23); that 
he did not know if there was a treasurer (D 4:26-29); that he was 
"appointed" secretary by Darrell Hafen (D 5:1-3); that he did not 
know the date of this alleged "appointment" (D 5:4-9) but that he 
did not get "appointed" at a stockholders' meeting (D 5:10-15); 
that there had been two meetings of stockholders, but these 
alleged meetings were on Christmas day and there are no minutes 
of them, or of any stockholders' meetings for that matter (D 
5:16-28); that he did not know the last time that a directors' 
meeting had been held (D 5:29-31 & 6:1-8); that he knew of no 
directors' meetings that had ever been held (D 6:9-11); that he 
knew of no other meetings of stockholders or directors that 
Darrell Hafen had ever held (D 6:12-30); that he did not even 
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know what the word "directors" meant in the context of a 
corporation (D 9:9-15); that all the corporate stock was given to 
the shareholders—no one paid anything for their stock (D 11:29 
to 13:15); that he had never sent a notice of stockholders1 
meeting to any of the stockholders (D 13:16-19); that no notice 
was sent to stockholders regarding the two alleged "stockholders' 
meetings" held on Christmas day (D 13:20 to 14:3); that he did 
not even know who the "directors" of Dixie were (D 14:8-15); that 
he had never prepared minutes of any meetings (D 14:15-16); that 
there was no corporate authorization to open Dixie's bank 
accounts at either Sun Captial Bank or First Security Bank (D 
14:17 to 16:7); that he did not know how many signatures were 
required to withdraw funds from Dixie's account (D 16:8-10); that 
it was his father's idea to open the account (D 16:14-15); that 
Dixie hired an attorney (Mr. Gubler) to represent the 
corporation, but that there was no directors' meeting or other 
corporate authorization to do so, but that Darrell Hafen took it 
upon himself to hire counsel (D 17:15-30); that he didn't like 
the attitude of a bank officer at Sun Capital Bank and took it 
upon himself to transfer the funds to a new account at First 
Security Bank, without any corporate authorization (D 21:1-15); 
that no tax returns have ever been filed by Dixie (D 29:21 to 
30:9); that he withdrew funds from Dixie's account to pay bills, 
such as the lease payments of the Ford Fiesta automobile that 
Darrell G. Hafen drives (D 31:5 to 32:7), to make "loans" to 
family members (D 32:8-17), and to pay the personal traffic 
tickets of Darrell G. Hafen (D 32:19-20); that there were no 
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notes or other documents to evidence the alleged corporate 
"loans" (D 32:23-30); and finally, that there was no interest due 
on the alleged loans (D 33:1). 
In 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations Section 52, page 857, 
there is a checklist of 17 facts and circumstances tending to 
show when a corporate president is the alter ego of the 
corporation. The above references to John Hafen's deposition 
includes 13 of the 17 factors on that checklist. Under these 
circumstances, this case meets the test of this checklist and 
also the test of Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Company 
(Utah, 1979) 596 P.2d 1028 that (1) there must be such unity of 
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individuals no longer exist, so that the 
corporation is in fact the alter ego of one or a few individuals; 
and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a 
fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow. 
The Court of Appeals has recently upheld the piercing 
of the corporate veil in two cases where the circumstances were 
not as compelling as this case. First, in Walker v. Carlson 64 
Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1987), four factors were listed as 
sufficient grounds for piercing the corporate veil, namely, (1) 
failure to issue stock; (2) failure to keep minutes; (3) 
commingling funds; and (4) failure to capitalize. All of these 
factors exist in this case except possibly the first. John Hafen 
testified to the alleged stock ownership, but no certificates 
were produced. 
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In the second case, Colman v. Colman 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 
7 (Ct. App. 1987) , the court said that: 
"It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove actual 
fraudf but must only show that failure to pierce the 
corporate veil would result in an injustice." 
The court then listed eight factors that should be considered 
(among others), in determining if this test has been met. Of 
those 8 factors, seven can be found in the deposition of John 
Hafen alone. Only the nonpayment of dividends is not covered by 
the deposition, as that question was not asked. The court found 
six of the eight factors to exist in Colman, and upheld the 
piercing of the corporate veil. A close reading of that opinion 
will show that more effort was made in that case to observe 
corporate formalities than in this case. Transamerica has 
certainly met the standard for appellate review set forth in 
Colman that ". . .the trial court's decision to pierce the 
corporate veil will be upheld if there is substantial evidence in 
favor of the judgment." There can be no doubt that Dixie is 
simply the alter ego of Hafen. 
Even in the pleadings, Dixie and Hafen have virtually 
admitted that Dixie is nothing more than the pocketbook of Hafen. 
In seeking a continuance for the trial, Dixie filed the affidavit 
of its attorney (R 368-369), Scott Gubler, stating that Hafen was 
being held in custody on a federal conviction in Massachusetts, 
and that Hafen had told him that he could not afford to travel to 
Utah for the trial "because of lack of funds in that Plaintiff 
(Transamerica) has attached all traveling funds which would have 
been available to Darrell G. Hafen for traveling purposes." If 
25 
the funds were not Hafen's funds they would not have been 
available to him. That statement appears to be what one might 
call a "freudian slip"—an admission that the court's ruling was 
indeed correct. 
Dixie concedes that under certain circumstances a 
creditor can pierce the corporate veil and hold an individual 
stockholder liable for the debts of the corporation. Dixie, 
however, argues that the reverse is not permissable, i.e., that 
one cannot apply the alter ego theory to hold the corporation 
(or its assets) liable for the debts of the individual, or, as 
some have termed it, to pierce the corporate veil "backwards". 
While this situation is not nearly so common, it 
nevertheless is a proper application of the alter ego doctrine. 
Initially, it might be said that common sense would tell us that 
if an individual can be held for the debts of a corporation, a 
corporation (in proper circumstances) can be held for the debts 
of an individual. More persuasively, perhaps, the cases also say 
the same thing. In fact, the Colman case was such a case, which 
held the corporation's assets subject to and included in a 
divorce settlement agreement. 
In Dockstader v. Walker 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 
at page 528, the proper use of the "alter ego" doctrine is 
explained as follows: 
"The term "alter ego" is used to describe a situation 
where the courts go behind the corporate entity and 
hold a stockholder liable for the debts of the 
corporation or to hold that it is the stockholder and 
not the corporation which owns the assets. 
The doctrine is generally applied to situations known 
as fone-man corporations1, i.e., where one man owns 
practically all of the stock, either directly or 
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through others who hold it for his use and benefit, and 
where the stockholder uses the corporation as a shield 
to protect him from debts or wrongdoings." (Emphasis 
Supplied). 
Thus, Utah has consistently recognized that the 
corporate entity can be pierced "backwards". In the instant 
case, Hafen has used Dixie to hold his assets to protect them 
from his personal "debts and wrongdoings". The doctrine of 
piercing of the corporate veil can be applied "backwards" to 
place liability on the corporate entity for debts owed by one who 
controls and dominates the corporation. See Reynolds Pallet & 
Box Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1963); Goldberg v. 
Engelberg, 34 Cal. App. 2d 10, 92 P.2d 935 (1939). 
Typical of such cases, is the case of Grotheer v. Meyer 
Rosenberg, Inc., (Calif., 1936) 53 P.2d 996. It is a 1936 case 
that has been cited several times for the proposition of piercing 
the corporate veil "backwards". It is discussed here because it 
is almost on "all fours" with the instant case. In that case, 
plaintiffs sought to hold the defendant, Meyer Rosenberg, Inc. 
liable for the payment of a money judgment previously obtained by 
plaintiffs against Meyer Rosenberg, individually, upon the ground 
said corporation was the alter ego of Meyer Rosenberg, the 
individual. Plaintiffs obtained a writ of attachment at the 
commencement of the action and caused it to be levied on the 
corporate bank account, just as was done in the instant case. 
The corporation moved to dissolve the attachment and it was 
dissolved. Plaintiffs appealed, and the court reversed, 
reinstating the writ of attachment. The appellate court noted 
that it was alleged that Meyer Rosenberg had transferred all his 
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property to the corporation to place that property beyond 
plaintiffs1 reach, so that plaintiffs' claim, or judgment, could 
not be satisfied. On page 998, the court said: 
"If the foregoing allegations are true, then Meyer 
Rosenberg, Inc., is doubtless liable for the debts of 
Meyer Rosenberg individually, for it is well settled 
that inasmuch as the separate personality or capacity 
of a corporation is but a statutory privilege, it must 
not be utilized for fraudulent purposes, such as a 
cloak or disguise for the evasion of contracts or other 
obligations; . . . The separateness of the person and 
the corporation would of course be recognized if no 
inequitable results would follow. But, where, as here, 
an inequitable result would follow, the two should be 
considered as one, . . . " (Emphasis Added). 
This case not only held that the alter ego doctrine can 
be applied "backwards", but that attachment of the allegedly 
corporate assets was appropriate. 
In Wilson v. Stearns, (Calif., 1954) 267 P.2d 59, 
Wilson, a real estate broker, had an agreement with Stearns, a 
subdivider and builder of homes on tract properties, to sell 
Steam's property. Later, Stearns transferred the land to a 
corporation, Alamo Development Company, which developed the 
property. Wilson assisted in the sales, but was not paid. 
The issue pertinent here, that was raised there, was whether 
Alamo Development Company, which had signed no agreement with 
Wilson, could be held liable for Stern's personal debts. 
The court, after reviewing the facts which justified a 
finding that Stearns and Alamo were one and the same—that Alamo 
was the alter ego of Stearns—held at page 68: 
"The foregoing recital of evidence convinces us that 
there were here present all the necessary elements to 
constitute an alter ego relationship between George 
Stearns and Alamo Development Company, the corporation, 
namely, (1) control of the corporation by Stearns; (2) 
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that the corporation was but the mere conduit of the 
business of Stearns; (3) that recognition of the 
separate existence of the corporation would sanction a 
fraud and permit oppression and injustice." 
The court held that the two should be considered as one 
and allowed Wilson to recover from Alamo, the corporationf for 
the debt of Stearns, the individual. Regarding the standard of 
review and the alter ego doctrine, the court said: 
"The trial court was the judge of the value and effect 
of evidence challenging the verity of the testimony 
here narrated. The separate personality or capacity of 
a corporation being but a statutory privilege, it must 
not be utilized for fraudulent purposes, such as a 
cloak or disguise for the evasion of contracts or other 
obligations. The evidence here strongly points to the 
conclusion that the corporation was distinctly a 
one-man corporation. Where it appears that a 
corporation is being used merely as an instrumentality 
through which an individual who is the owner of its 
capital stock transacts his business, and where an 
inequitable result would ensue, the two should be 
considered as one." 
The court also pointed out, at page 69, that: 
"It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove actual 
fraud. It is enough if the recognition of the two 
entities as separate would result in an injustice." 
(Emphasis Added). 
In the instant case, whether there is a showing of 
fraud or not is unimportant, just that an injustice would occur, 
i.e., that Hafen could steal large sums of money from 
Transamerica, as he has been convicted of doing, but could defeat 
efforts to recover some or all of the money by putting his own 
assets in a corporation which the court has already determined is 
nothing but his alter ego. It should not matter, as far as 
justice and equity are concerned, whether it is the same money, 
or whether it is other funds legitimately belonging to Hafen that 
are attached. 
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State ex. rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co. (Wyo. 
1944) 144 P.2d 944, dealt with an attempt by the organizers of a 
corporation to avoid a workman's compensation obligation of their 
predecessor partnership. On pages 949-50, the court, quoting 
from an earlier case, adopted as its own, the following: 
" 'It is now so well established that it has become 
almost aphoristic that upon a proper showing that a 
corporation is but an instrumentality through which its 
owner or substantial owners for convenience transacts 
or transact his or their business, by the great weight 
of authority, both equity and law will look through the 
form to its substance and will hold such corporation 
bound as the owner of the corporation might be bound or 
conversely hold the owner bound by acts which bind his 
corporation. And so, where an individual owns all of 
the stock of a corporation or substantially so, and 
that the corporation is in truth and in fact, but the 
juristic double of its owner and where fraud or 
injustice will likely operate to the injury of third 
persons, this situation suffices to dissipate the 
separate fictional identity of the corporation and the 
law will have no compunction in holding the corporation 
liable for the acts of its owners or vice versa. And 
this rule is the same though the stock of the 
corporation is owned by two or more who act in 
conjunction with the corporate organization. (Citations 
omitted.) Actual intent to defraud is not necessary. 
It is sufficient if the refusal to recognize the fact 
of the identity of the corporate existence with that of 
the individual would bring about an inequitable result. 
(Emphasis Added). 
Finally, after holding the corporation liable for the 
debt of the individual partnership, the court in Christensen made 
the following observations at page 952: 
"It has been held that 'the conditions under which the 
corporate entity may be disregarded, or the corporation 
be regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders, 
necessarily vary according to the circumstances in each 
case inasmuch as the doctrine is essentially an 
equitable one and for that reason is particularly 
within the province of the trial court." 
Plaintiffs submit that the ruling of the district court 
in the instant case was proper and that the alter ego principal, 
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of piercing the corporate veil "backwards" to hold the 
corporation liable for the individual debts of the person 
controlling and dominating the corporation, in the appropriate 
circumstances shown here, is just as appropriate as the common 
practice of piercing the corporate veil to hold an individual 
liable for a corporate debt in the proper circumstances. 
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISSOLVING THE FIRST 
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT. PERSONAL SERVICE WAS 
NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE DEFENDANTS1 MADE A GENERAL 
APPEARANCE BY COUNSEL. IN ANY EVENT, THE SECOND 
WRIT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED, SERVED, AND MAINTAINED. 
The district court dissolved the first writ of 
attachment on the grounds (R 167-168) "That notice was not 
properly served as required by Rule 64A(7) upon defendant 
corporation, Dixie Power and Water, Inc." Said rule provides as 
follows: 
"(7) Any notice required under this Rule shall be in 
such form and served in such manner as will 
expeditiously give the adverse party actual notice of 
the proceeding, all as directed by the court." 
Only actual notice is required, personal service on the 
registered agent, president, or secretary of Dixie, is not the 
only way to give actual notice. As long as Dixie had actual 
notice of the attachment, and of the hearing to be held thereon, 
so that it could appear and defend, that is all that is 
necessary. The record shows that not only Dixie, but all 
defendants, had actual notice of the attachment and of the 
hearing because all the defendants made appearances in the 
matter. The record shows that Hafen contacted the court and 
Transamerica1s attorney and requested a continuance of the 
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hearing (R 37-38) , which was granted. Although this contact was 
by telephone, and not in person, it shows that Hafen had actual 
notice of the attachment and of the hearing to be held thereon. 
Next, all defendants sought and were granted another continuance, 
this time through an attorney, Fay E. Reber (R 50-51) . John 
Hafen, the alleged secretary of Dixie, was personally served with 
a subpoena to appear at the next hearing (R 65-66) scheduled for 
April 13, 1982. At that hearing Dixie appeared by attorney Scott 
A. Gubler. The matter was continued to May 10, 1982 when the 
hearing was held (R 69), and the matter continued to June 8, 
1982, when the district court ruled that the writ should be 
dissolved. 
A voluntary appearance by a party is sufficient to give 
the court jurisdiction over him. This was the ancient law, and 
it is still valid. (Adam v. Saenger 303 U.S. 59, 58 S.Ct. 454, 
82 L.Ed. 649, 1938). The record shows that the money on deposit 
at First Security Bank was attached and later deposited with the 
Clerk of the court, who has placed the funds in an interest 
bearing account. The bank was properly served and the return of 
service is in the court file (R 32-35). There can be no doubt 
that the court has jurisdiction of the property, in this case, 
money. Kramer v. Pixton 72 Utah 1, 268 P. 1029 states the 
well-known rule regarding personal jurisdiction on page 1031: 
"Personal service of summons, or a general appearance 
in an action by attorney or otherwise, is universally 
held to give a court jurisdiction of the person of a 
defendant." 
The law in Utah is that an appearance solely to seek a 
continuance is a general appearance subjecting that party to the 
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in personam jurisdiction of the court. This long-established 
rule was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in Cooke v. Cooke 
(Utah, 1926) 248 P. 83, where the court stated, on page 106: 
"An application for an extension of time to plead is a 
recognition of the jurisdiction of the court over the 
person and constitutes a general appearance." 
The court went on to say that this general appearance cannot be 
limited in effect or scope by any statement on the part of 
counsel. 
Accordingly, the district court erred when it dissolved 
the first writ of attachment because the defendants all had 
actual notice of the writ and of the hearings. By dissolving the 
writ, the district court possibly subjected Transamerica to a 
claim for damages. 
As soon as the court dissolved the first writ, 
Transamerica immediately move for a new writ of attachment 
(R152-154), which the court held under advisement until it 
finally granted a new writ on October 15, 1982. The request for 
a new writ of attachment was made in open court on July 14, 1982 
(Tl pp. 4 & 5), so it was not issued without notice. A new 
undertaking was obtained (R 181), the writ was served (R 
197-199) , and notices of the hearing on the writ were given to 
all parties (192-196) , the hearing was held (R 216-217) and the 
writ continued in effect until summary judgment was granted. 
There have been no defects in the second writ, and, of course, by 
the time this second writ issued, the court had already ruled (R 
171) that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen, so Dixie cannot be 
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heard to complain that its funds were unlawfully attached, as the 
funds actually belonged to Hafen. 
Defendants were all personally served on June 10, 1982 
(R 96-98) , filed their answer (R 99-103) and an "Ex Parte Motion 
For Stay" (R 104) on June 27, 1982f so no complaint can be made 
about the hearing after that date. 
Both writs were issued based upon the verified 
complaint (R 1-27) , which more than adequately alleges that Dixie 
was the mere alter ego of Hafen and clearly sets forth the 
specific facts showing that immediate injury, loss, or damage 
would result. Had Transamerica proceeded by complaint and 
motion, Hafen would have moved the funds at his bank in the blink 
of an eye. After having taken Transamerica to the tune of 
$394,380.75, Transamerica had to act quickly and without notice 
to attach funds whereever it could find them. The remedy of a 
prejudgment writ of attachment was designed and intended for 
situations like the one presented here. There was no error in 
issuing the writs of attachment. 
IV. AN ATTORNEY'S LIEN CANNOT BE IMPRESSED ON FUNDS 
THAT DO NOT BELONG TO THE ATTORNEY'S CLIENT. 
On June 8, 1982 the district court ruled that Dixie 
Power And Water, Inc. was the alter ego of Defendant Darrell G. 
Hafen and that the assets of Dixie were, in fact, the assets of 
Hafen. This ruling was subsequently reduced to an "Order And 
Judgment" dated July 14, 1982 (R. 171). 
It was not until after this ruling that Scott A. 
Gubler, Dixie's attorney, first filed a claim seeking an 
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attorneyfs lien on the attached funds. The ruling was made June 
8, 1982 and the alleged attorney's lien was first claimed three 
days later on June 11, 1982 (R 93). Mr. Gubler has never, at any 
time in this case, represented the owner of the attached funds, 
to-wit, Defendant Darrell G. Hafen. He has only represented the 
alter ego, the corporate shell called Dixie Power And Water, Inc. 
Further, as of June 11, 1982 when the lien was claimed, Mr. 
Gubler had not filed an answer containing a counterclaim nor had 
there been a verdict, report, decision or judgment in Dixie's 
favor. Under these circumstances, the Utah attorney's lien 
statute does not allow an attorney's lien. 
Section 78-51-41, UCA, 1953, as amended, provides in 
part that: 
"From the commencement of an action or the service of 
an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who 
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause 
of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, 
report, decision, or judgment in his client's favor . 
. . " (Emphasis Added). 
The statute lays down two requirements, neither of 
which are met in this case. First, an attorney's lien attaches, 
in the case of defendant's attorney, only after the service of an 
answer containing a counterclaim. Mr. Gubler did not file a 
counterclaim until December 12, 1982 and then only to correct 
this defect. Until then, his efforts had been limited to 
attempts to secure the release of the funds attached. However, 
this was some six months after this Court ruled the assets did 
not belong to his client. Second, there must be a decision or 
judgment in his client's favor. His client is Dixie Power And 
Water, Inc. and no decision or judgment in favor of Dixie has 
35 
ever been made. The ruling that the assets of Dixie were, in 
fact, the assets of Hafen and a decision against Mr. Gubler's 
client. This was a finding that Darrell G. Hafen owned the 
assets (bank account) which was attached. Dixie has been found 
by the district court not to own the attached funds. Mr. 
Gubler's attorney's lien cannot be asserted against funds not 
owned by his client. 
In Lundeberg v. Dastrup v. Husbands 28 Utah 2d 28, 497 
P.2d 648, after citing the attorney's lien statute, the court 
said: 
"The lien which this statute gives the attorney is upon 
his client's cause of action and/or the judgment; and 
with respect thereto he stands in no better position 
than his client. For the same reasons stated above, 
indicating that the plaintiffs' judgment does not run 
against either Alyce Husbands or Mick Caravelli, any 
lien the plaintiffs attorney may have thereon is 
likewise not effective against them." 
Dixie has no final judgment in its favor in this matter 
as it pertains to the attached funds. Mr. Gubler's lien cannot 
attach to assets not owned by his client. In 7 Am.Jur. 2d 
Attorneys At Law Section 315, page 332, it states, in reference 
to attorney's liens, that "Its existence depends on possession by 
the attorney of money or property of his client.", and cites 
Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders 21 Utah 2d 181, 442 P.2d 938, a 
case in which the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"It is to be noted that the statute above set out gives 
to an attorney what is called a charging lien which 
attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in 
his client's favor and to the proceeds thereof, etc. 
(emphasis original). At the time of the order 
purportedly giving liens to the attorney, the plaintiff 
had no verdict, report, decision, nor judgment in his 
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favor, andf of course, he had no proceeds therefrom. 
The statute gives a lien to the attorney on the fruits 
of his labor so as to protect him against an unjust 
enrichment on the part of a nonpaying client." 
As this case illustrates, there can be no attorney's 
lien because (1) there are no assets of Dixie Power And Water, 
Inc. to which it could attach; and (2) there is no decision or 
judgment in favor of Mr. Gubler's client. 
An additional point precluding this attorneyfs lien is 
the absence of a cause of action to which it may attach. In 7 
Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys At Law, Section 339, pages 347-48 it 
states, again citing Midvale Motors, supra, that: 
"It is said that an attorney's charging lien attaches 
to the fruits of his skill and labor. If the 
attorney's work is sterile and produces no fruit, then 
he has no lien. . . . The statute may provide that 
the lien shall attach from the date of filing suit, the 
time of commencement of the action, or the time of 
service of summons. In the case of the attorney for 
the defense, it may provide that his lien attaches on 
service of an answer containing a counterclaim." 
The Utah statute, quoted above, provides that the lien 
of an attorney for a defendant attaches only on ". . .the service 
of an answer containing a counterclaim." Mr. Gubler had not 
filed an answer containing a counterclaim, or even an answer, on 
behalf of his client before the pivotal decision of June 8, 1982 
as to who owned the attached funds, and does not fit the 
statutory definition of attorneys entitled to the lien. 
A fourth, and final, reason to deny the lien is that 
Utah law requires the attorney to bring a separate action against 
his client to determine the amount of the lien. In 7 Am. Jur. 2d 
Attorneys At Law, Section 345, page 351, it states: 
"It has been held that an attorney's lien on property 
recovered may, on application to the court, be enforced 
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in the original action in which the services were 
rendered. . . . On the other hand, the rule of some 
courts is that, in the absence of special circumstances 
requiring a contrary holding to prevent injustice, 
counsel must bring a separate action against his client 
to determine the amount of his fee and to foreclose his 
charging lien if he has any." 
Utah law follows the latter rule, requiring a separate 
action to be brought. As stated in Midvale Motors, supra, at 
page 941: 
"While there is authority to the effect that an 
attorney's lien on property recovered in an action may 
on application to the court be enforced in the original 
matter (see 7 Am.Jur. 2d, Attorneys At Law, § 302), we 
think the better rule, in the absence of special 
circumstances requiring a contrary holding to prevent 
injustice, is to require counsel to bring a separate 
action against his client to determine the amount of 
his fee and to foreclose his charging lien if any he 
has." 
Mr. Gubler's alleged lien is improper under the Utah 
statute because (1) the assets he is attempting to lien do not 
belong to his client; (2) there has been no decision or judgment 
in favor of his client; (3) no answer containing a counterclaim 
was filed by Mr. Gubler before this Court determined the assets 
belonged to Darrell G. Hafen; and (4) no separate action has been 
brought to determine his lien, if any. 
V. THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND 
SECTION 76-3-201.2 OF THE UTAH CODE OPERATES 
TO CONCLUSIVELY DETERMINE LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. 
Dixie argues that there was no basis to grant summary 
judgment because there were material issues of fact, but Dixie's 
brief fails to set forth any facts that Dixie contends were 
material or that were in dispute. The only specific item 
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mentioned in Dixie's brief is the allegation that there was no 
proof that would permit the court to find fraud by Dixie in its 
orgainization or operations. As has been discussed in Point II, 
supray in order to apply the alter ego doctrine, it is not 
necessary for a court to find fraud in the organization or 
operation of a corporation—it is sufficient if the court finds 
there is a unity of interest or ownership or that one person 
dominates or controls the corporation and that observance of the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
allow an inequitable result. Any of the three is sufficient, but 
in the instant case, all three are present. 
As to any doubt about the liability of defendant 
Darrell G. Hafen in this matter, he was convicted in the United 
States District Court, District of Massachusetts, in Criminal No. 
82 00053, of 19 counts of mail fraud on the same deposits and 
redemptions pertaining to this matter. Certified copies of his 
conviction are part of the record on this appeal (R 476-503) . 
The standard of proof in the criminal matter (beyond a reasonable 
doubt) is much higher than the standard in this civil action. 
The court found that Hafen has admitted his signatures on the 
checks in this matter (R 346-347) by failing to establish a 
defense as required by Section 70A-3-307(2) of the Utah Code. 
Liability was properly established. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 3, and 4 establish the amount 
of damages. No dispute has ever been made as to the amount 
established by these exhibits. 
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Further, Section 76-3-201.2(2) of the Utah Code, 
provides: 
"If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides 
the issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary 
damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively 
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a 
subsequent civil action." (Emphasis Added). 
Hafen's liability is therefore conclusively determined. There 
was no error in granting the summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment order of the district court should 
be affirmed. Also, the Supreme Court should rule that the 
district court erred when it dissolved the first writ of 
attachment, because the defendants had actual notice of the writ 
and the hearing thereon. This ruling should be made to preclude 
the subsequent filing of a lawsuit for damages by defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of December, 1987. 
)HN L. MILES 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
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